When the probability of not reneging commitment of optimal monetary policy under quasi-commitment tends to zero, the limit of this equilibrium is qualitatively and quantitatively di¤erent from the discretion equilibrium assuming a zero prob- JEL classi…cation numbers: C61, C62, E31, E52, E58.
Introduction
The degree of credibility of policy makers, measured by their probability of not reneging their commitment, is a key determinant of the e¢ ciency of stabilization policy. This paper shows that when the probability of not reneging commitment of optimal monetary policy under "quasi-commitment" or "loose-commitment" (Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007) , Debortoli and Nunes (2014) , Debortoli and Lakdawala (2016) , Campbell and Weber (2018) , Fujiwara, Kan and Sunakawa (2019)) tends to zero, the limit of this equilibrium is completely di¤erent from the discretion equilibrium assuming a zero probability of not reneging commitment for the usual example of the new-Keynesian Phillips curve.
The impulse response functions, welfare losses and initial anchors (or jump) of in ‡ation are much larger with zero credibility than with near-zero credibility. The policy rule parameters have opposite signs, which causes a saddle-node bifurcation of the economy dynamic system with the in ‡ation auto-correlation (or growth factor) parameter shifting from above one (zero credibility) to below one (near-zero credibility). Hence, a slight imperfect knowledge of structural parameters leads to in ‡ation or de ‡ation spirals for zero-credibility policy with a huge loss of welfare in the following two years. With the same slight imperfect knowledge of structural parameters, near-zero credibility, limited credibility and perfect credibility policy lean against in ‡ation spirals with a moderate loss of welfare. The zero-credibility policy is a highly risky policy advice. It leans against in ‡ation spirals only with an exact knowledge, with in…nite precision, of the slope of the new-Keynesian Phillips curve and of other parameters of the monetary policy transmission mechanism.
These results are obtained for any value of the elasticity of substitution between goods larger than one. This parameter enters into the slope of the new-Keynesian Phillips curve and the welfare loss function. The key intuition is with limited credibility, the policy maker's Lagrange multipliers of each private sector forward-looking variables are predetermined variables which are eliminated by assumption in the zero credibility model.
This originates a bifurcation of the economy dynamic system which is common to all dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model of the private sector solved with zero credibility for ever of the policy maker (optimal simple rule or discretionary policy) which have a lower number of stable eigenvalues than the same DSGE model of the private sector solved with Ramsey optimal policy with limited credibility.
Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007, p.304) …rst statement that "quasi-commitment converges to full commitment for the probability of reneging commitment tends to zero" is valid. Their second statement that "it also converges to discretion when the probability of reneging commitment tends to one" is not valid, as demonstrated in this paper. This result is not marginal, because it suggests that there is no practical relevance for policy makers of the zero credibility discretion model, which is commonly used in macroeconomic theory. It lacks robustness to misspeci…cation with respect to near-zero credibility and its representation of the lack of credibility for ever is extreme. By contrast, quasicommitment models includes substitutes for extreme cases with near-zero credibility, such as a probability of not reneging commitment equal to 10 7 , which are robust to misspeci…cation.
Section 2 presents Ramsey optimal policy under imperfect commitment and discretionary policy. Section 3 computes eigenvalues, policy rule parameters, initial anchors of in ‡ation on the cost-push shock, impulse response functions, welfare and robustness to misspeci…cation, in particular for the limit case of near-zero probability versus zero probability of not reneging commitment. The last section concludes.
Limited Credibility versus Zero Credibility For Ever

Ramsey optimal policy under quasi-commitment
In a monetary policy regime indexed by j, a policy maker may re-optimize on each future period with exogenous probability 1 q strictly below one ("quasi commitment" by Schaumburg and Tambalotti, 2007 and Nunes, 2014) ). Following Schaumburg and Tambalotti (2007), we assume that the mandate to minimize the loss function is delegated to a sequence of policy makers with a commitment of random duration. The degree of credibility is modelled as if it is a change of policy-maker with a given prob-ability of reneging commitment and re-optimizing optimal plans. The length of their tenure or "regime" depends on a sequence of exogenous i.i.d. Bernoulli signals f t g t 0 with E t [ t ] t 0 = 1 q, with 0 < q < 1. If t = 1; a new policy maker takes o¢ ce at the beginning of time t. Otherwise, the incumbent stays on. A higher probability q can be interpreted as a higher credibility. As seen below, this leads to use a "credibility adjusted" discount factor q in the policy maker's optimal behavior.
Because structural parameters may change for a new regime k, long run equilibrium values may also change. Under regime j, policy plans solve the following problem, omitting subscript j for the central bank welfare preferences " (see appendix 2), for the transmission mechanism parameter , the auto-correlation of the cost-push shock u t and its variance of its disturbances t :
where x t represents the welfare-relevant output gap, i.e. the deviation between (log) output and its e¢ cient level. t denotes the rate of in ‡ation between periods t 1 and t.
E t denotes the expectation operator. The utility the central bank obtains is next period objectives change is denoted V jk . In ‡ation expectations are an average between two terms in the new-Keynesian Phillips curve (appendix 1). The …rst term, with weight q is the in ‡ation that would prevail under the current regime upon which there is commitment.
The second term with weight 1 q is the in ‡ation that would be implemented under the alternative regime, which is taken as given by the current central bank. The key change is that the narrow range of values for the discount factor around 0:99 for quarterly data (4% discount rate) is much wider for the "credibility weighted discount factor" of the policy maker: q 2 ]0; 0:99].
Di¤erentiating the Lagrangian with respect to the policy instrument (output gap x t ) and to the policy target (in ‡ation t ) yields the …rst order conditions:
> :
that must hold for t = 1; 2 
The natural boundary condition 0 = 0 minimizes the loss function with respect to in ‡ation at the initial date:
It predetermines the policy instrument which allows to anchor the forward-looking policy target (in ‡ation). The in ‡ation Euler equation corresponding to period 0 is not an e¤ective constraint for the central bank choosing its optimal plan in period 0. The former commitment to the value of the policy instrument of the previous period x 1 is not an e¤ective constraint. The policy instrument is predetermined at the value zero x 1 = 0 at the period preceding the commitment. Combining the two …rst order conditions to eliminate the Lagrange multipliers yields the optimal initial anchor of forward in ‡ation 0 on the predetermined policy instrument x 0 .
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012, chapter 19) seek the stationary equilibrium process using the augmented discounted linear quadratic regulator solution of the Hamiltonian system (Hansen and Sargent (2007) ) as an intermediate step (Chatelain and Ralf (2017) algorithm). This amount to seek a stable subspace of dimension two in a system of three equations including the marginal condition on the policy instrument (or on the Lagrange multiplier on in ‡ation). The policy instrument is exactly correlated with private sectors variables:
with solutions (see appendix) followed for = 0:99:
We denote the in ‡ation eigenvalue instead of in Gali (2015) . It is the solution of the following characteristic polynomial:
The dynamics are unique with an initial optimal anchor of forward-looking in ‡ation on the cost-push forcing variable, which is enforced by the optimal initial anchor of in ‡ation on the policy instrument 0 = 1 "
x 0 . This optimal anchor rules out sunspot equilibria:
The policy instrument (output gap), which can be substituted by the Lagrange multiplier of in ‡ation, is optimally predetermined. The auto-regressive cost-push forcing variable is also predetermined. The optimal solution of the Hamiltonian system indeed satis…es Blanchard and Kahn (1980) determinacy condition with two stable eigenvalues:
the in ‡ation persistence parameter and the auto-regressive parameter of the cost-push forcing variable.
Zero Credibility For Ever
With quasi-commitment, the probability of not reneging commitment could be in…nitely small (near-zero credibility), but it remains strictly positive: for example, q = 10 7 > 0 with q 2 ]0; 1], hence q 2 ]0; 0:99]. An in…nite horizon zero-credibility policy holds when the policy maker re-optimizes with certainty for all future periods: q = 0. This zerocredibility policy is mentioned as "discretionary policy". It is equivalent to the optimal simple rule in this model.
The central bank minimizes its loss function subject to the new-Keynesian Phillips curve and such that private sector and the central bank policy instrument reacts only to the contemporary predetermined variable u t at all periods t with a perfect correlation.
Each period the monetary authority is assumed to choose in ‡ation and output gap in order to minimize the period losses
subject to the constraint of the new-Keynesian Phillips curve where the expectation of future in ‡ation is taken as given by the policy maker, because it is a function about future policy instruments (output gaps) and future cost-push shocks which cannot be currently in ‡uenced by the policy maker who has zero credibility for ever.
The optimality condition implies a policy rule with perfect negative correlation of the policy instrument (output gap) with the policy target (in ‡ation) with constant parameter
given by the opposite of the household's elasticity of substitution between goods:
x t = " t for t = 0; 1; 2; ::: with " > 1.
Assuming that both the policy instrument and the policy target are forward-looking and that the cost-push shock is the only predetermined variable, Blanchard and Kahn (1980) determinacy condition forces a unique solution which is given by the unique slope of the eigenvectors of the given stable eigenvalue 0 < < 1 of the cost-push shock:
There is an exact positive correlation between in ‡ation and the cost-push shock:
Combining this equation with the policy rule leads to the exact negative correlation between output gap x t and the cost-push shock u t is:
The policy maker lets the output gap and in ‡ation deviate from their targets in exact proportion of the current value of the cost-push shock.
Bifurcation
Expected impulse response functions
The key equations are the expected impulse response functions, taking the expectations of random shocks (table 1) . As detailed in the next sections, the policy parameter response F of the policy instrument to deviation of the policy target is positive for limited credibility and negative for zero-credibility. It is a bifurcation parameter which implies that the in ‡ation eigenvalue is smaller than one for limited credibility and larger than one for zero-credibility. The initial jump of in ‡ation (the …rst element of the column vector before u 0 ) have di¤erent formula. In the case of zero-credibility, the initial jump of in ‡ation reduces the dimension of the dynamics to be of dimension one, whereas dynamics remains of dimension two for limited credibility. For this reason, there is no need for a second parameter F u in the policy rule for zero-credibility, else it would not be identi…ed. By contrast, a second parameter F u in the policy rule is required in order to control the economy which evolves in two dimensions with limited credibility. The key result is with limited credibility, the policy maker's Lagrange multipliers of each private sector forward-looking variables are predetermined variables which are eliminated by assumption in the zero credibility model. Hence, determinacy implies a larger number of stable eigenvalues for limited credibility than in the zero-credibility case. This implies robustness to misspeci…cation of the transmission mechanism for limited credibility and no robustness to misspeci…cation for the zero-credibility model. Credibility Impulse response functions following u 0
Impulse response function are written in table 2 and represented on …gure 1 for four di¤erent degrees of credibility q: 0 (zero credibility for ever), 10 7 (near-zero credibility), 0:5 (limited credibility), 1 (in…nite horizon commitment). The calibration of parameters are taken from Gali (2015) with his corresponding impulse response functions for q = 0 and q = 1.
From table 2 and …gure 1, with limited commitment, the parameters of the in ‡ation dynamics (…rst row of the matrix and the jump vector) change marginally between q = 1 and q = 10 7 . In ‡ation eigenvalue increases from = 0:43 to 0:57. In ‡ation sensitivity with lagged cost-push shock shifts from 0:13 to 0:08. In ‡ation initial anchor on costpush shock shifts from 0:65 to 0:57.
The shifts from near-zero credibility q = 10 7 to zero credibility q = 0 are wide. In ‡a-tion eigenvalue increases from = 0:57 to 1:78 (multiplied by 3, crossing the bifurcation value 1). In ‡ation sensitivity with lagged cost-push shock shifts from 0:08 to 1:01
(multiplied by 12). In ‡ation initial anchor on cost-push shock shifts from 0:57 to 1:03 (multiplied by 1:8). The impulse response function of in ‡ation of zero credibility is markedly over the impulse response functions of in ‡ation with limited credibility, including near-zero credibility. This is re ‡ected in the evaluation of the relative welfare loss.
Welfare Losses
The expected loss function is for zero probability of not reneging commitment (q = 0) is given by:
We did not …nd a closed form formula for welfare losses in the case of limited credibility.
We simulate the model over 200 periods in order to compute welfare for di¤erent elasticity and di¤erent credibility (table 3) . For comparison with the welfare of in…nite horizon regimes, the limited credibility welfare is arbitrarily computed using a discount factor of = 0:99 instead of q in order to take into account in a approximation the regimes which appears with probability 1 q. 23:6% 141% Because there is a wide gap between the large impulse response functions of zerocredibility q = 0 with respect to near zero credibility q = 10 7 , the welfare gap between near-zero versus zero credibility is also gigantic: from 71% if " = 3193 to 117% when " tends to one.
When considering only limited credibility cases, the losses with respect to in…nite horizon commitment are at most an increase of 24% of welfare losses in the limit case of the elasticity of substitution tending to 1, (corresponding to a large relative weight on output gap in the loss function of 0:34) for all the range of non-zero probabilities of reneging commitment.
Bifurcation of the in ‡ation eigenvalue
This section demonstrates that shifting from limited credibility to zero credibility implies a saddle-node bifurcation of the dynamic system for the new-Keynesian Phillips curve transmission mechanism. The Lagrange multiplier on forward-looking in ‡ation or the policy instrument is optimally predetermined for Ramsey optimal policy. The policy instrument is forward-looking with in…nite horizon zero-credibility policy. This implies an additional stable eigenvalue for Ramsey optimal policy with respect to zero-credibility policy, according to Blanchard and Kahn (1980) determinacy condition.
Proposition 1 For any value of the elasticity of substitution between goods " > 1,
there is a saddle-node bifurcation on the in ‡ation eigenvalue when shifting from limited credibility q 2 ]0; 1] (stable eigenvalue 0< < 1) to zero credibility for ever q = 0 (unstable eigenvalue ZC > 1).
Proof. For " 2 ]1; +1[, we seek the limits of " which is an increasing function of ".
Zero-credibility (q = 0) in ‡ation eigenvalue is an increasing function of ". Its boundary conditions are: shifting from limited credibility q 2 ]0; 1] (stable eigenvalue ) to zero credibility for ever q = 0 (unstable eigenvalue ZC ), it is su¢ cient to prove:
which is true because:
and because when q ! 0 + :
Hence, there is a saddle-node bifurcation when shifting from limited credibility q 2 ]0; 1] with a stable in ‡ation eigenvalue to zero credibility for ever q = 0 with an unstable in ‡ation eigenvalue ZC .
Remark 2 One also checks that there is no ‡ip bifurcation within the regimes of limited credibility q 2 ]0; 1], seeking the lower bound of the in ‡ation eigenvalue: 
Credibility Eigenvalue
On …gures 1 and 2, the limited credibility eigenvalue has an upper bound equal to 1 1+ max = 0:746 for near zero credibility q and near one elasticity of substitution between goods ". The larger the credibility q, the lower the eigenvalue and the faster the convergence of in ‡ation to equilibrium. The limit eigenvalues obtained with a near-zero probability of not reneging commitment q = 10 7 are widely di¤erent from the eigenvalues obtained with a zero probability of reneging commitment q = 0 for all values of the elasticity of substitution larger than one.
Policy rule parameter as a bifurcation parameter
The feedback rule parameter F of the response of the policy instrument to deviations of in ‡ation is a bifurcation parameter which drive the bifurcation of the in ‡ation eigenvalue larger than one for zero credibility to smaller than one for limited credibility (q 2 ]0; 1]).
The in ‡ation rule parameter is an a¢ ne and decreasing function of the in ‡ation eigenvalue according to 1 q and conversely.
Proposition 3 For any value of the elasticity of substitution between goods " > 1, the in ‡ation policy rule parameter F is positive for limited credibility. For zero-credibility, the in ‡ation policy rule is negative and below -1.
Proof. One has:
For limited credibility:
For limited credibility, the policy rule parameter of the response to in ‡ation is a decreasing function of credibility q and an increasing function of the elasticity of substitution ". To prove that the policy rule is positive, it is su¢ cient to prove:
When q ! 1 and when " ! 1
In this case, one shows in the appendix that F > 0 is equivalent to + > which is true because ! max > 0. Proof. Output gap and in ‡ation are exactly linearly related at the initial date x 0 = " 0 for limited and zero-credibility case. The anchor of in ‡ation on the cost-push shock are generally di¤erent between limited credibility versus zero credibility:
For zero credibility, the anchor of in ‡ation is a decreasing function of " which is an increasing function of ".
, the zero credibility initial anchor of in ‡ation ( 0 =u 0 ) is bounded:
For limited credibility, the anchor of in ‡ation is a decreasing function of " which is an increasing function of ". As max < " < The initial anchor of near-zero credibility is always strictly smaller than the initial anchor in the case of zero credibility. The gap tends to zero when the auto-correlation of the forcing variable tends to zero and when the elasticity of substitution tends to one: ! 0
and " ! 1.
QED.
With = 0:8, for any elasticity of substitution and for any probability of not reneging commitment, the zero credibility initial anchor of in ‡ation is much higher (+80%) than the limited credibility initial anchor of in ‡ation (…gure 5). 
Robustness to misspeci…cation
We assume that there is a misspeci…cation by the private sector and the policy maker on their exact knowledge of parameters ; ; ; "; u 0 so that the initial anchor of in ‡ation 0
deviates from 10% with respect to its value with exact knowledge of parameters. This assumption is grounded by a number of major measurement issues:
1. In ‡ation 0 is not measured with exact precision. This error is related to consumer price index versus core in ‡ation, quality adjusted bias and the revisions of national accounts.
2. A major source of new-Keynesian uncertainty is the measurement of the unobservable cost-push shock initial value u 0 depending on its past value u 1 , on its auto-correlation and on the disturbance 0 . The cost-push shock is indirectly measured an auto-correlated residual. It faces identi…cation issues when an additional lag is included for in ‡ation in hybrid Phillips curve. As a residual, it varies widely depending on misspec…cation of in ‡ation dynamics.
3. The estimated slope ( ; "; L ; ; ; ') of the new-Keynesian Phillips curve in only known with a standard error. It sign is even uncertain (Mavroeidis et al. (2015)). It is itself a function of six not so precisely known structural parameters ( ; "; ; ; ; '), in particular the proportion of …rms who do not reset their price at each quarter.
4. The elasticity of substitution between di¤erentiated inputs " in monopolistic competition which enters into welfare relative weight is not precisely known. Some authors may refer to the measurement of Lerner index which are themselves lacking precision, with a calibration of " = 11 instead of Gali (2015) calibration of " = 6.
5. The policy maker discount factor may vary much more with a adjusted discount factor q depending on the probability q of not reoptimizing. We compute two impulse response functions of out of equilibrium path when facing 10% error on the initial anchor of in ‡ation.
For near zero credibility (q = 10 7 ), the error gap of 10% with respect to the perfect knowledge optimal path at the initial date is reduced to less than 1% after eight quarters (…gure 8).
For zero credibility (q = 0), the error gap of 10% with respect to the perfect knowledge optimal path at the initial date is increased to 110% after four quarters and to 270% after eight quarters (…gure 9) with in ‡ation or de ‡ation spirals. After six quarters, the divergence of in ‡ation reaches +1% additional in ‡ation with +10% error or 2% additional de ‡ation with 10% error with respect to the perfect knowledge impulse response function.
In the perfect knowledge case, which has a probability zero for practitioners of stabilization policy, the expected impulse response function may suggest that discretionary policy leans against in ‡ation spirals, while using in ‡ation rule parameters destabilizing the in ‡ation eigenvalue. By contrast, in the imperfect knowledge case with zero credibility, the outcome of discretionary policy is a probability equal to one of in ‡ation or de ‡ation spirals. The core behavioral hypothesis that a policy maker sticks to an exactly zero probability of not reneging commitment for ever is also an assumption with a probability zero for practitioners of stabilization policy.
Conclusion
Even in the most favorable case of an elasticity of substitution between goods tending to one, the limited-credibility equilibrium when the probability to renege commitment tends to zero is never the limit of the zero credibility for ever equilibrium: positive sign versus negative sign of the response of the policy instrument to in ‡ation, stability versus instability of the in ‡ation eigenvalue, small versus large initial anchor of in ‡ation, small versus large magnitude of welfare loss, robustness versus lack of robustness to a large range of misspeci…cation and measurement error. 
Appendix 1: New-Keynesian Phillips Curve
The reference new-Keynesian Phillips curve is the monetary policy transmission mechanism:
u t denotes a cost-push shock. denotes the discount factor. E t denotes the expectation operator. The cost push shock u t includes an exogenous auto-regressive component:
The disturbances u;t are identically and independently distributed (i.i.d.) according to a normal distribution with constant variance 
with " > 1, 0 < ; L ; < 1, > 0, ' > 0. 
Appendix 2: Welfare loss function
In a monetary policy regime indexed by j, a policy maker has a period loss function
. If the policy maker is maximizing welfare, its preferences x depend on structural parameters of the transmission mechanism (Gali (2015) :
With Gali's (2015) calibration of structural parameters: = 1:02 2+"
and " = 6, the relative weight of the variance of the policy instrument (output gap) is a very low proportion 
The solution of the Hamiltonian system are based on the demonstrations of the aug- 
The characteristic polynomial of this upper square matrix is:
The Hamiltonian matrix has two stable roots and ( is denoted in Gali (2015) ) and one unstable root . The determinant of the matrix is
. The trace of the matrix is
Policy rule parameter function of (") and ":
Hamiltonian system function of the stable eigenvalue (eliminating "): u 0 in a stable subspace of dimension two within a space of dimension three ( t ; t ; u t ) of the Hamiltonian system. We seek a characterization of the Lagrange multiplier t of the form:
To deduce the control law associated with vector (P ; P u ), we substitute it into the Hamiltonian system: We write the last two equations in this system separately:
P t+1 + P u u t+1 = (P 1) t + P u u t u t+1 = u t It follows that:
The …rst equation is such that: The method of undetermined coe¢ cients implies for the …rst term:
For the second term:
(1
QED
Proposition A2: Optimal policy rule parameters formulas:
Demonstration:
The …rst order condition relates Lagrange multiplier to the policy instrument:
x t = " t+1 = "( t t )
x t = F t + F u u t = "( t t ) = "(P t + P u u t t ) ) F = "(P 1), F u = "P u Proposition A3: From LQR to Gali (2015) vector basis (replace policy target by policy instrument).
One has: x t = x t 1 + (1 ) F A u t 1 = x t 1 + " q 1 u t 1 Proposition A4: Inequality demonstration.
One has the following inequalities (1 + q + )
2
( 1 + q + ) 2 = 4 ( + q) > 4 q + q > q which is true.
